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The existing literature on firms, based on incomplete contracts and property rights, emphasizes that
the ownership of assets - and thereby firm boundaries - is determined in such a way as to encourage
relationship-specific investments by the appropriate parties. It is generally accepted that this approach
applies to owner-managed firms better than to large companies. In this paper, we attempt to broaden
the scope of the property rights approach by developing a simple model with three key ingredients:
(a) decision rights can be transferred ex ante through ownership, (b) managers (and possibly workers)
enjoy private benefits that are non-transferable, and (c) owners can divert a firm’s profit. In our basic
model decisions are ex post non-contractible; in an extension we use the idea that contracts are reference
points to relax this assumption. We show that firm boundaries matter. Nonintegrated firms fail to account
for the external effects that their decisions have on other firms. An integrated firm can internalize such
externalities, but it does not put enough weight on the private benefits of managers and workers. We
explore this tradeoff in a model that focuses on the difficulties companies face in cooperating through
the market if the benefits from cooperation are unevenly divided; therefore, they may sometimes end
up merging. We show that the assumption that contracts are reference points introduces a friction that



















1.  Introduction 
 
In the last twenty years or so, a theoretical literature has developed that argues that the 
boundaries of firms--and allocation of asset ownership--can be understood in terms of 
incomplete contracts and property rights. The basic idea behind the literature is that firm 
boundaries define the allocation of residual control rights and, in a world of incomplete 
contracts, these matter. In the standard property rights model, parties write contracts that are ex 
ante incomplete but that can be completed ex post; the ability to exercise residual control rights 
improves the ex post bargaining position of an asset owner and thereby increases her incentive, 
and the incentive of those who enjoy significant gains from trade with her, to make relationship-
specific investments, and as a consequence, it is optimal to assign asset ownership to those who 




Although the property rights approach provides a clear explanation of the costs and benefits of 
integration, as a number of people have argued, the theory seems to describe owner-managed 
firms better than large companies.
2  There are several ways to see this.  First, according to the 
theory, the major impact of a change in ownership is on those who gain or lose ownership rights; 
however, in a merger between two large companies, it is often the case that the key decision-
makers (the CEO’s, for example) do not have substantial ownership rights before or after the 
merger. Second, the relationship-specific investments analyzed are made by individuals rather 
than by firms; this again resonates more with the case of small firms than that of large 
companies. Third, and perhaps most important, the approach envisions a situation of “autarky,” 
in which all the relevant parties meet and bargain ex post over the gains from trade and the only 
                                                 
1 See Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995). This literature builds on the earlier 
transaction cost literature of Williamson (1975, 1985) and Klein et al. (1978). Extensions of the model show that it 
is sometimes optimal to take assets away from someone to improve their incentives to make relationship-specific 
investments (e.g., to discourage rent-seeking behavior). On this, see Baker et al. (2002), Chiu (1998), de Meza and 
Lockwood (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
2 For a discussion of this and related points, see Holmstrom and Roberts (1998) and Holmstrom (1999).  
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issue is who has the right to walk away with which assets; there are no other decisions in the 
model. As it stands, the model has no room for “organizational structure,” “hierarchy” or 
“delegation”; in an important sense, the model continues to describe a pure market economy, 
although one enriched by the idea that individuals can be empowered through the ownership of 
key nonhuman assets. 
 
The purpose of the current paper is to modify the property rights approach so that it can be 
applied to a broader set of organizational issues, including the organization of large firms. We 
will develop a model in which contracts cannot be completed costlessly ex post and where 
therefore the final outcome depends on who has decision-making authority. We begin by 
describing the key ingredients of our approach. 
 
We will focus on two units that have a horizontal or lateral relationship. We think of a unit as an 
irreducible set of activities that it would be meaningless to break up further. We will be 
interested in the case where each unit makes a decision that affects the other unit, i.e., there are 
externalities. For example, the units may be deciding whether to adopt a common standard for 
their technology or product. Or the units might represent two departments or schools in a 
university that must choose whether to make their curriculum requirements compatible or 
synchronize their academic calendars. Later in the paper we will use the model to interpret 
Cisco’s approach to platform leadership through acquisitions.  
 
For simplicity we focus on the case where each unit has a binary decision: it can choose “Yes” or 
“No”. Moreover, we simplify matters further by supposing that there are only two aggregate 
outcomes, which we term “coordination” or “non-coordination”. Coordination occurs if and only 
if both units choose Yes. Non-coordination occurs if one or both units choose No. Later in the 
paper we briefly discuss more general decisions. 
 
The decision in each unit is ex ante non-contractible. The owner of a unit has the right to make 
the decision in that unit ex post; that is, the owner has residual control rights as in the property 
rights literature. We will refer to the owner as the boss. In the simplest version of the model each  
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unit’s decision is also ex post non-contractible. We will compare two leading organizational 
forms. In the first, non-integration, the units are separate firms, and each unit is owned by its 
manager. In the second, integration, the units are part of a single firm, and a professional 
manager is the owner. These are not the only possibilities. For example, one could consider 
another form of integration where one of the unit managers is the owner. However, the main 
insights of our analysis can be obtained from considering the two leading forms. 
 
Full integration would always be optimal if all the benefits and costs from decisions were 
transferable through contract or ownership. To avoid this uninteresting conclusion, we assume 
that each unit generates two kinds of benefit: monetary profit and private (nontransferable) 
benefits in the form of job satisfaction for those working in the unit. For the most part, we will 
assume that the manager is the only worker and hence private benefits refer to her job 
satisfaction. We assume that the boss of a unit can divert all the profit from that unit to herself. 
This simplifies the analysis by ruling out profit-sharing as a way to influence incentives. Profit 
sharing would alleviate, but not eliminate, the effects we describe. 
 
To illustrate how firm boundaries affect decision making, consider the simplest setting, where ex 
post decisions, as well ex ante decisions, are non-contractible. Denote the pair of profits and 
private benefits (measured in money) accruing to each unit by  ) , ( A A w v  and  ) , ( B B w v , 
respectively. Then, if the units are nonintegrated and manager  A is the boss of unit  A and 
manager B  the boss of unit B , manager  A will maximize  A A w v +  since she diverts the profit 
from unit  A and cares about her own private benefits, and manager B  will maximize  B B w v +  
for similar reasons. In contrast, if units  A and B  are integrated, then, if a (professional) outsider 
is the boss, she will maximize  B A v v + , since she diverts all the profit and does not care about 
private benefits. 
 
As a benchmark, note that social optimality is achieved by maximizing total surplus: 




The important point here is that integration results in less weight being placed on private benefits 
than non-integration. Under non-integration,  B A w w ,  each appears in one boss’s objective 
function. In contrast, under integration, the w’s fails to appear in the overall objective function. 
However, this diminished influence of private benefits is offset by the fact that, under 
integration, total profits, rather than individual unit profits, are maximized. 
 
In summary, under non-integration, bosses have the right balance between private benefits and 
profits, but are parochial (they do not take into account their effect on the other unit), while, 
under integration, they have the right balance between units, but ignore private benefits. In our 
basic model, where the only issue is whether the units coordinate, we show that non-integration 
and integration make the opposite kind of mistake. Non-integration leads to too little 
coordination. This happens if the benefits from coordination are unevenly divided across the 
units. One unit may then veto coordination even though it is collectively beneficial. In contrast, 
under a weak assumption—specifically, that coordination represents a reduction in 
“independence” and therefore causes a fall in private benefits—integration leads to too much 
coordination. 
 
To return to the example of two departments or schools in a university deciding whether to make 
their curriculum requirements compatible or synchronize their academic calendars: under non-
integration, compatibility or synchronization may not occur when it should, given that each unit 
values autonomy and the gains are unevenly divided; under integration, compatibility or 
synchronization may occur when it shouldn’t, given that the dean or president puts too little 
weight on a unit’s autonomy.  
 
We analyze the above model in Section 2. We go on to argue that the model has some 
undesirable features. One of them is that, even if decisions are ex post non-contractible, it is not 
clear why decision rights cannot be traded ex post. But if such trading is possible, then ex ante 
organizational form will not matter (given the absence of ex ante investments). To deal with this 
and related difficulties, in Section 3 we drop the assumption that decisions are ex post non-
contractible. At the same time we embellish the model by introducing some behavioral features  
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along the lines of Hart and Moore (2008). In particular, we suppose that a contract (or 
organizational form) is a reference point for parties’ entitlements: parties do not feel entitled to 
outcomes outside those specified by the contract but may disagree about outcomes within the 
contract. A person who does not get what he is entitled to is aggrieved and shades on 
performance in non-contractible ways, creating deadweight losses. In these circumstances, ex 
post bargaining about decisions or decision rights is not costless, and ex ante organizational form 
matters. We show that the main elements of our analysis are unchanged. The new feature is that, 
under integration, the boss will put some weight on the private benefits of the unit managers, 
given their ability to shade. Thus the boss’s decisions will partly internalize unit managers’ 
preferences. 
 
In Section 4, we generalize the model to allow for delegation of decision-making authority under 
integration. We argue that it is hard to make sense of delegation in the model of Section 2, or for 
that matter in much of the literature, since it is unclear why the boss cannot change her mind ex 
post and take back the decision rights that she has delegated.
3  The behavioral approach in 
Section 3 can help here. We assume that reversing delegation is regarded by the subordinates as 
a “breach of promise” or “hold-up” and leads to increased levels of aggrievement and shading. 
This makes delegation a credible commitment device: the boss will reverse herself only in 
“extreme” states of the world. We show that integration with delegation can be a valuable 
intermediate organizational form between non-integration and integration. Under delegation, 
managers get their way in states of the world where decisions matter significantly more to them 
than to the boss. However, in states of the world where the boss cares a lot about the outcome, 
either managers will do what the boss wants of their own accord, given the threat of shading by 
the boss, or the boss will take back the decision rights. 
 
The interpretation that private benefits are enjoyed by a single manager is restrictive in that it 
implies that the units are in effect sole proprietorships under non-integration. In Section 2 we 
briefly consider a second interpretation of the model that applies to the case where the units are 
large companies, and private benefits refer to the aggregate job satisfaction of workers.  
                                                 




Our paper is related to a number of ideas that have appeared elsewhere in the literature. First, 
there is an overlap with the literature on internal capital markets; see particularly Stein (1997, 
2002), Scharfstein and Stein (2000), Rajan et al. (2000), Brusco and Panunzi (2005), and Inderst 
and Laux (2005). This literature emphasizes the idea that the boss of a conglomerate firm, even if 
she is an empire builder, is interested in the overall profit of the conglomerate, rather than the 
profits of any particular division. As a result, the conglomerate boss will do a good job of 
allocating capital to the most profitable project (“winner-picking”). Our idea that the professional 
boss of an integrated firm maximizes total profit is similar to this; the main differences are that 
the internal capital markets literature does not stress the same cost of integration as we do – the 
insufficient emphasis on private benefits – or allow for the possibility that the allocation of 
capital can be done through the market (in our model, the market is always an alternative to 
centralized decision-making). Second, the idea that it may be efficient for the firm to have 
narrow scope and/or choose a boss that is biased toward particular workers is familiar from the 
work of Shleifer and Summers (1988), Rotemberg and Saloner (1994, 2000), and Van den Steen 
(2005). These papers emphasize the effect of narrow scope and bias on worker incentives rather 
than on private benefits or wages, but the underlying premise, that workers care about the boss’s 
preferences, is the same. However, none of these papers analyzes firm boundaries. Third, there 
are several recent works that use the idea that some actions are non-contractible ex ante and ex 
post but may be transferable through ownership; see, e.g., Aghion et al. (2004), Alonso et al. 
(2008), Baker et al. (2008), Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Hart and Moore (2005), Holmstrom 
(1999), Mailath et al. (2004), and Rantakari (2008). Mailath et al. (2004) is perhaps the paper 
closest to ours. They analyze a model in which the boss of an integrated firm maximizes total 
profit and so internalizes externalities. However, the cost of integration in their paper is a decline 
in worker initiative resulting from hold-up, rather than an insufficient emphasis on private 
benefits. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The basic model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 
introduces reference points. In Section 4 we analyze delegation. Section 5 illustrates the model 




2.  A Basic Model of Coordination 
 
Our model concerns two units A and B. For simplicity, we focus on a basic coordination choice. 
Each unit has a binary decision: it can choose “Yes” or “No.” There are two aggregate outcomes: 
“coordination” or “non-coordination”. Coordination occurs if and only if both units choose Yes. 
The timeline is as in Figure 1. At the beginning, an organizational form is selected—specifically, 
whether the units should be separate firms (non-integration, i.e., there are two bosses) or should 
merge into one firm (integration, i.e., there is one boss). Next, each unit decides whether to 












We assume that the decision in each unit is made by the owner or boss of that unit. We will also 
assume in this section that the Yes/No decisions are non-contractible, both ex ante and ex post, 
and furthermore that the right to make these decisions is nontransferable ex post (in contrast, it 
can be transferred ex ante through the integration choice). In the next section, we will show that 
these assumptions can be relaxed in a more elaborate version of the model. An implication of 
these assumptions is that a contract in which one unit agrees to choose Yes, say, in return for a 
side-payment from the other unit cannot be enforced. In other words, Coasian bargaining will not 
ensure efficiency of the coordination choice. 
 
We represent payoffs from different outcomes in the following matrix. We assume that these 




Unit B  
  Y N  
Y   A:  ) , ( ), , ( Y Y w Y Y v A A   A:  ) , ( ), , ( N N w N N v A A  
Unit  A  B :  ) , ( ), , ( Y Y w Y Y v B B   B :  ) , ( ), , ( N N w N N v B B  
N   A:  ) , ( ), , ( N N w N N v A A   A:  ) , ( ), , ( N N w N N v A A  




Here, unit  A is the row player, and unit B  is the column player. The entries are the payoffs. 
Note that the outcome when one party chooses No is the same as when both parties choose No: 
non-coordination. The first coordinate “v” refers to profit and the second coordinate “w” to 
private benefits (private benefits are measured in money). Subscripts refer to units, i.e.,  ) , ( A A w v  
denotes unit  A’s payoffs and  ) , ( B B w v  unit B ’s. 
 
It will be convenient to introduce the notation 
 
(2.1)  B B B A A A w v z w v z + ≡ + ≡ , . 
 
Here,  A z  refers to total surplus in unit  A,  B z  to total surplus in unit B , and  B A z z +  equals 
aggregate social surplus. Also, define 
 
, , ), , ( ) , (
, , ), , ( ) , ( ) 2 . 2 (
, , ), , ( ) , (
B A i N N z Y Y z z
B A i N N w Y Y w w




= − = Δ
= − = Δ
= − = Δ
 
 
to be the changes in profit, private benefits and surplus resulting from coordination. 
 
As noted in the introduction, private benefits refer (broadly) to job satisfaction or on-the-job 
consumption. It is reasonable to suppose that part of job satisfaction stems from the ability to 
pursue an independent course or agenda. Thus, we will assume that coordination leads to a  
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reduction in private benefits: 
 
(2.3)  0 , 0 ≤ Δ ≤ Δ B A w w . 
 
We put no restrictions on whether coordination increases or decreases profits; moreover, even if 
coordination increases total profits, profits may rise by more or less than the fall in private 
benefits, i.e.,  ) , ( Y Y  may be more (socially) efficient than ) , ( N N , ) 0 ( > Δ + Δ B A z z , or less 
) 0 ( < Δ + Δ B A z z . We begin by considering the case where each unit contains one individual (a 
manager), who enjoys the private benefits. In addition, we suppose that a boss can divert all the 
profit from the units she operates. Then there are two leading organizational forms: 
 
(1) Non-integration: Manager  A is the boss of unit  A, and manager B  is the boss of unit B , 
i.e., the units are sole proprietorships. Manager  A maximizes  A z , and manager B  
maximizes  B z . 
(2) Integration: A professional manager (outsider) is the boss of both units, and managers  A and 
B  are subordinates. The professional manager maximizes  B A v v + . 
 
Note that, in (1), the managers play a non-cooperative game, while, in (2), no strategic elements 
are involved: the professional manager simply maximizes total profit. 
 
Note also the critical role played by the assumption that the Yes/No decisions are non-
contractible. In the absence of this, the parties would negotiate to an efficient ex post outcome 
using side-payments, i.e.,  B A z z +  would be maximized under all organizational forms. 
 
(1) and (2) are not the only possible organizational forms. If the units are under common 
ownership, manager  A (resp., manager B ), rather than a professional, could be the boss; she 
would then maximize  A B A w v v + +  (resp.,  B B A w v v + + ). Furthermore, even if the units are 
separately owned, they could be run by a professional manager (it is even possible that manager 
A could be the boss of unit B  and vice versa). However, in the case of certainty, the first-best  
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can always be achieved by (1) or (2). Thus, we focus on these. 
 
Although the decisions Yes or No are non-contractible ex ante and ex post, we will assume that 
organizational form is contractible at the beginning of the period. Coasian bargaining will then 
ensure that organizational form is chosen efficiently, i.e., to maximize total surplus ( B A z z + ) 
(there are no wealth constraints, and information is symmetric). To spell this out a little more: if 
the units are initially manager-owned but integration is more efficient, then a professional 
manager will purchase control rights from managers  A and B  at prices such that all three parties 
are better off (in particular, manager i’s private benefit under the professional manager plus the 
lump sum she receives for her control rights is at least equal to her payoff under non-integration); 
and if the units are initially owned by a professional manager and non-integration is more 
efficient, then managers  A and B  will purchase control rights from the professional manager at 
prices such that all three parties are better off. 
 
In summary, organizational form is chosen at the beginning of the period to maximize the value 
of  B A z z +  in the subsequent game. 
 
It is easy to understand the tradeoff between non-integration and integration. Under non-
integration, each boss has a veto on coordination. Thus, (Y, Y) will occur if and only if  ) , ( Y Y  
Pareto dominates  ) , ( N N : 
 
(2.4)  0 , 0 ≥ Δ ≥ Δ B A z z . 
 
Note that, even if (2.4) holds,  ) , ( N N  is always a Nash equilibrium along with ) , ( Y Y ; however, 
we will suppose that parties do not pick a Pareto-dominated equilibrium. 
 
It is, of course, immediate that (2.4) implies that  ) , ( Y Y  maximizes social surplus: 
 




However, equally clearly, the converse is not true: (2.5) does not imply (2.4). This is the problem 
of winners and losers. Even though aggregate surplus may rise, the distribution may be such that 
one party loses out, and this party will then veto coordination, leading to the outcome  ) , ( N N . 
To stress what should be obvious by now: Coasian bargaining does not solve this problem, given 
that the  N Y /  decisions are non-contractible (and so is the outcome of these decisions). 
 
Let us now turn to integration. Under integration, a single boss chooses the outcome that 
maximizes total profit. This outcome will be  ) , ( Y Y  or  ) , ( N N  according to whether 
 
(2.6)  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v . 
 
It follows from (2.3) that, under integration,  ) , ( Y Y  is always the outcome if it is efficient but 
may be the outcome even if it is inefficient. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the outcomes under non-integration and integration.
4  We have drawn the 
figure keeping  B A w w Δ Δ ,  fixed and letting  B A v v Δ Δ ,  be variable, but this, of course, is done 
merely to stay within two dimensions. In general, we are interested in the mapping from profits 
v and private benefits w into the choice of organizational form. 
 
                                                 
4 We thank George Baker for suggesting this picture.  
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0 = Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ B B A A w v w v
0 = Δ + Δ B A v v
B v Δ
FB
B w Δ −












The first-best decision rule (2.5) is represented by the line  FB FB − ; all pairs of profit 
gains  ) , ( B A v v Δ Δ  that fall above this line call for coordination. In a similar way, line 
I I −  represents the decision rule (2.6) and the quadrant  NI NI −  the decision rule under 
non-integration. Note that  FB FB −  is above  I I − , because the sum of the changes in 
private benefits is negative by (2.3). 
 
The figure shows that non-integration and integration make the opposite kind of mistake. Under 
non-integration, there is too little coordination in the sense that  ) , ( Y Y  never occurs if it is 
inefficient but may not occur if it is efficient. Under integration, there is too much coordination 
in the sense that  ) , ( Y Y  is always the outcome if it is efficient but may be the outcome even if it 
is inefficient. It follows that non-integration achieves the first-best if  ) , ( N N  is efficient (since 
non-integration errs on the side of too little coordination but never too much), while integration 
achieves the first-best if  ) , ( Y Y  is efficient (since integration errs on the side of too much  
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coordination but never too little).
5 
 
It is also clear from Figure 2 that, for some parameter values, non-integration and integration 
both achieve the first-best. This is the case when  ) , ( Y Y  is the outcome under non-integration or 
when ) , ( N N  is the outcome under integration. In all other cases, it is essential to choose the 
right organizational form. Non-integration will lead to inefficiency if profit gains from 
coordination are sufficiently unevenly distributed between the two firms; staying above the 
FB FB −  line and moving in parallel with it will eventually take us outside the  NI NI −  
acceptance region. Integration will lead to inefficiency if private costs from coordination are 
large enough; raising private costs will move the  NI NI FB FB − − /  part of the figure to the 
northeast and eventually make  ) , ( N N  the first-best choice.
6   
 
We summarize the discussion in 
 
Proposition 1. If  ) , ( N N  is efficient, non-integration (with unit managers as bosses) achieves the 
first-best. If  ) , ( Y Y  is efficient, integration (with a professional manager as boss) achieves the 
first-best. Furthermore, taking as given the profit gains from coordination and supposing them to 
be large, integration will be uniquely optimal if these profit gains are sufficiently unevenly 
divided between units. Non-integration will be uniquely optimal if private costs from 
coordination are sufficiently high in aggregate. 
 
                                                 
5 We have made the assumption that unit managers are locked in for a period and cannot quit. If quitting were 
possible, then under integration the boss would be forced to internalize some of the managers’ private benefits since 
if she pursued profit too much at the expense of private benefits, managers would leave. Obviously, quitting 
becomes more of an issue in a multi-period model where decisions are long-term, and a decision that reduces 
managerial independence might force the boss to pay higher wages in the future. In many interesting situations, 
however, it is plausible that managers and workers are not on the margin of quitting, perhaps because they have 
made relationship-specific investments or they are paid efficiency wages. When managers and workers are not on 
the margin, our analysis is likely to generalize. 
6 In Figure 2, the region of inefficient integration could be reduced by letting manager B  run the integrated unit. 
This way, B ’s private benefits would be accounted for, something manager  A would be happy with as long as she 
also dislikes coordination. However, if, in contrast to (2.3),  A enjoys private benefits from coordination but B  
does not, then manager B  would coordinate too little relative to first-best, and hence the comparison to a 
professional manager would be ambiguous. We do not explore these options here, since we get first-best either way.  
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A More General Analysis of Coordination 
 
We have made the strong assumption that not only are unit decisions binary but there are only 
two aggregate outcomes: the outcome when one party chooses N  is the same as when both 
choose N . If the latter assumption is relaxed, new features arise. We briefly describe these. 
There are now four outcomes:  ) , ( ), , ( ), , ( ), , ( N N Y N N Y Y Y . Suppose that private benefits are 
weakly lower when a unit chooses Y , rather than N . Also assume that total surplus and profit 
are maximized either if both units choose Y  or if neither does. Finally, suppose that, if a unit 
chooses N , then total surplus in that unit is weakly higher if the other unit chooses Y , and that if 
the other unit chooses N , total surplus in the first unit is weakly higher if it chooses N . 
 
These assumptions capture the idea that choosing Y  means accommodating your actions to suit 
the other party and that this may be collectively beneficial but privately costly. They all hold in 
the model of pure coordination described above. However, they also cover cases where units are 
deciding on the prices or characteristics of their products. 
 
Given these assumptions, one can show that non-integration achieves efficiency if ( N N, ) is 
efficient, but may not if ( Y Y, ) is efficient; and that integration achieves efficiency if ( Y Y, ) is 
efficient, but may not if (N ,N) is efficient. As before, ( Y Y, ) may not be a Nash equilibrium 
under non-integration even if it is efficient because the benefits are unevenly divided between the 
units. But now, ( Y Y, ) may fail to be a Nash equilibrium for another reason: even if ( Y Y, ) 
Pareto dominates ( N N, ), a unilateral deviation may be in the interest of one party. In other 
words, one party may free-ride on the other party’s accommodation decision. 
 
In summary, many of our results hold in this more general model of coordination. 
 
An Alternative Interpretation of Private Benefits 
 
So far, we have emphasized the interpretation where the private benefits  i w  are enjoyed by a  
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single manager in each unit, who is the boss under non-integration and a subordinate under 
integration. However, there is a second interpretation of the model that is of interest. We can 
imagine that the private benefits refer to the job satisfaction of unit i workers and that some 
bosses have goals that are (partially) congruent with those of the workers, i.e., they care about 
the same things. In particular, suppose that there are three types of bosses, unit  A enthusiasts 
with preferences  A A w m λ + ; unit B  enthusiasts with preferences  B B w m λ + ; and professional 
managers with preferences m . Here, m  is money and  B A λ λ ,  represent congruence between a 
boss’s goals and those of unit  A and B  workers.
7 
 
Suppose now that a boss can divert a fraction  1 < α  of total profit toward herself; one can 
imagine that she uses this profit for perks or empire-building activities that benefit her alone - 
fancy offices, secretaries, pet projects, etc. Denote profit by v. Then a unit i enthusiast will 
maximize 
 
(2.9)  i i w v λ α +  
 
while a professional manager will maximize v.
8 
 If we make the simplifying assumption that 
B A λ λ α = = , this yields the same objective function for the different kinds of bosses as in the 
model without workers described above.
9 
 
                                                 
7 A boss may be biased toward its workforce because sustained contact with workers fosters friendship and empathy. 
Wrestling with the same problems, sharing the same information, and having a similar professional background are 
all conducive to a common vision that aligns interests, particularly on issues such as the strategic direction of the 
firm. Shleifer and Summers (1988) argue that it may be an efficient long-run strategy for a firm to bring up or train 
prospective bosses to be committed to workers and other stakeholders (on this, see also Blair and Stout (1999)). 
Milgrom and Roberts (1988) argue that frequent interaction gives workers the opportunity to articulate their views 
and influence the minds of their bosses, sometimes to the detriment of the firm. All these explanations are consistent 
with our assumption that the boss of a firm with broad scope will put less weight on private benefits than a boss of a 
firm with narrow scope. The reason is that, with a broader range of activities, the firm’s workforce will be more 
heterogeneous, making the boss experience less empathy for any given group. Also, the intensity of contact with any 
particular group will go down, reducing the ability of that group’s workers to influence the boss. 
8 With partial diversion, it may be desirable to give the manager of unit A a share of the residual profits of unit B in 
order to get closer to first-best, but we will not pursue this possibility here. 
9 It is obviously important that there is no boss who is an enthusiast for both units  A and B . Under integration, 
such a boss would maximize  B B A A B A w w v v λ λ α + + + ) ( , and if  B A λ λ α = = , this would yield the first-best.  
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In this interpretation, the choice of organizational form is made by the initial owner(s) of units  A 
and B  at the beginning of the period. They must decide whether the units should be separate 
(non-integration) or together (integration) and what kind of boss to put in charge. Assume that 
owners face a competitive labor market and wages are agreed up front. Then the (total) wage  i ω  
for unit i workers will satisfy 
 
(2.10)  U wi i = + ω , 
 
where U  is the (total) market clearing reservation wage and  i w  refers to (expected) worker 
private benefits.  In other words, a reduction in anticipated private benefits leads to an increase in 
the wages the firm needs to pay.
10  Suppose that the initial owner(s) wish to sell out and retire, 
i.e., they are interested only in money.  Then, given that side-payments are possible, 
organizational form will be selected to maximize the total value of the two units net of wages, 
i.e., given (2.10),  B A B A w w v v + + +  (we ignore the private benefits and remuneration of bosses). 
 
We may conclude that the analysis of this second interpretation of the model is identical to the 
previous one. 
 
3.   A Variation —The Aggrievement Model 
 
The model of Section 2 has some unpalatable features. First, the assumption that decisions are 
non-contractible ex post seems very strong. Most decisions are contractible at least in part, and 
the assumption has an unfortunate implication: essentially a boss has to do everything herself! If 
a boss tells a subordinate to do something, the subordinate will turn round and do what he wants 
without the fear of any legal sanction (at least in a one-shot game). This does not seem very 
plausible. 
 
                                                 
10 There is some evidence consistent with this. Schoar (2002), in a study of the effects of corporate diversification on 
plant level productivity, finds that diversified firms have on average 7% more productive plants, but also pay their 
workers on average 8% more than comparable stand alone firms.   
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Furthermore, even if decisions are non-contractible ex post, it is not clear why decision rights 
cannot be bought and sold (they are, after all, contractible ex ante). To put it another way it is not 
clear why ownership rights cannot be traded ex post. But this also creates problems for the model 
of Section 2 since it suggests that Coasian bargaining will ensure an efficient ex post allocation 
of decision rights regardless of the initial allocation, i.e., ex ante organizational form will not 
matter. 
 
Finally, as we will argue in the next section, the model of Section 2 does not permit an 
interesting analysis of delegation. 
 
In this section, we argue that one way to begin to deal with all of these problems is to introduce 
some behavioral features along the lines of Hart and Moore (2008). Hart and Moore (2008) take 
the view that contracts are reference points for parties’ entitlements and that a person who does 
not get what he feels entitled to is aggrieved and shades on performance, which hurts other 
parties and creates deadweight losses. That is, ex post performance is only partially contractible: 
“perfunctory” performance can be enforced but “consummate” performance cannot be. In the 
present context we will suppose that organizational form, negotiated under competitive 
conditions ex ante, is a reference point for ex post entitlements. If a party is allocated an 
ownership right ex ante then this gives that party the legal right to take (residual) decisions ex 
post. However, to the extent that another party does not like the ex post decision, the second 
party will feel aggrieved and will shade (if he can). Specifically, we will assume that a party who 
receives a payoff that is  i k  less than his payoff under his most preferred outcome or decision will 
be aggrieved by  i k  and that this party will shade to the point where the other parties’ payoffs fall 
by θ i k . Here θ  is the shading parameter, assumed the same for all parties, and  1 0 < <θ . 
Shading does not change the payoff of the party doing the shading. Thus, the total deadweight 
loss from shading is θ ∑
i
i k . 
 
Under the assumptions of the Hart-Moore model, ex post Coasian bargaining is no longer 
costless since each party will feel entitled to the best possible outcome in the negotiation, and  
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they cannot all be satisfied and will shade. Thus, ex ante organizational form, presumed to be 
negotiated under relatively competitive conditions, will matter. In the analysis below, we will, as 
a shortcut, rule out any sort of Coasian renegotiation (as in Hart-Moore (2008), but in contrast to 
Hart (2009)), but we just wish to observe here that renegotiation, because it is costly, is unlikely 
to overturn our results. 
 
Let’s revisit the model of Section 2. Assume now that, as in the standard incomplete contracts 
literature, the  N Y /  decisions are too complicated to specify ex ante, although they can be 
contracted on ex post. Thus the boss has the right to choose them ex post. However, as explained 
above shading is possible: only perfunctory performance by a subordinate is guaranteed. We 
assume that shading occurs only between parties who have dealings with each other. We suppose 
that horizontal units do not fall into this category, and so there is no shading under non-
integration. However, there is shading under integration: the boss and each subordinate are in a 
vertical relationship and each can shade against the other. 
 
Let’s start with non-integration. The analysis of Section 2 does not change. Coordination occurs 
if and only if both parties want it, i.e., if and only if (2.4) holds. Given our assumption that 
horizontal units cannot shade against each other, there is no shading. 
 
Integration is slightly more complicated. We divide the analysis into two cases. 
 
Case 1:  0 ≤ Δ + Δ B A v v . 
The managers’ and bosses’ preferences are aligned (given (2.3)). Coordination doesn’t occur 
since no one wants it, and, given that there is no disagreement, there is no shading. Social surplus 
is given by: 
 
(3.1)  ) , ( ) , ( N N z N N z S B A + = . 
 
Case 2:  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v .  
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Now the boss wants coordination, but the managers don’t, and they will be aggrieved by 
B A w w Δ + Δ  and will shade by  ) ( B A w w Δ + Δ θ  if it occurs. The boss will coordinate if and only if 
her payoff net of shading costs is higher: 
 
(3.2)  0 ) ( ≥ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ B A B A w w v v θ . 
 
In other words, the boss partly internalizes the wishes of her subordinates. On the other hand, if 
(3.2) doesn’t hold, the boss will go along with what the managers want and will not coordinate. 
However, in this case, the boss is aggrieved by  B A v v Δ + Δ  since she is not getting her preferred 
outcome, and so she will shade to the point where the unit managers’ payoffs fall by 
) ( B A v v Δ + Δ θ . 
 
Social surplus is thus given by 
 
(3.3)  ) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A w w Y Y z Y Y z S Δ + Δ + + = θ , if (3.2) holds, 
        ) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A v v N N z N N z Δ + Δ − + θ , if (3.2) doesn’t hold. 
 
The first-best is achieved in Case 1 but not in Case 2. In Case 2, there is too much coordination 
relative to the first-best ( ) 2 . 3 ( 0 ⇒ ≥ Δ + Δ B A z z  but not vice versa), and too much shading.  
 
Define an outcome to be efficient if it maximizes total surplus ignoring shading costs (in other 
words use the same definition as in Section 2). Then we have established 
 
Proposition 2. In the Aggrievement Model, if (N, N) is efficient, non-integration achieves the 
first-best. If (Y,Y) is efficient, integration leads to coordination, but integration may not be 
optimal given the deadweight losses from shading. Finally, if (Y,Y) is efficient and is an 





We see that, qualitatively, the tradeoffs of the basic model in Section 2 continue to hold in the 
Aggrievement Model, but there is an extra cost under integration due to shading. Because we 
have assumed that the managers will feel aggrieved in integration, but not in non-integration, the 
hurdle for coordination is higher ((3.2), rather than (2.6), must hold). However, it is still true that 




We now consider a form of governance that is intermediate between integration and non-
integration: integration with delegation, which we will refer to as delegation for short. Under 
delegation, the professional boss delegates her formal authority over decision rights to the unit 
managers. However, because the boss is legally in charge, there is nothing to stop her from 
changing her mind and taking back the decision rights ex post. We refer to the taking back of 
decision rights as a reversal: we assume that the timing is such that a reversal takes place ex post 
before managers actually make their decisions. We suppose that the subordinates regard a 
reversal as a “breach of promise” or a “hold-up”, and this leads to increased levels of 
aggrievement and shading: the shading parameter rises from θ  to θ , where  θ θ ≥ ≥ 1 . In the 
model of Section 2, where, implicitly, 0 = =θ θ , delegation has no value since the boss can 
costlessly change her mind. In contrast we will see that, with aggrievement and shading, 
delegation can have value as a partial commitment device. 
 
As in our discussion of integration in Section 3, there are two cases: 
 
Case 1:  0 ≤ Δ + Δ B A v v . 
Preferences are aligned, and no one wants coordination. So coordination doesn’t occur, and there 
is no shading. Social surplus is given by (3.1). 
 
Case 2:  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v . 
Now there is a conflict. Ignore reversal for the moment. If the managers do not coordinate, the  
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boss will be aggrieved. Suppose for simplicity that the boss observes only the outcome that 
coordination did not occur and not who was responsible for it (i.e., she does not observe 
managers’ individual decisions). Given that she does not know whom to blame, her shading is 
divided 50:50 between the two parties. Then the managers’ payoffs are given by 
B A i v v N N w B A i , ), (
2
) , ( = Δ + Δ −
θ
.  So the managers will choose to coordinate if 
 
(4.1) 
. 0 ) (
2
, 0 ) (
2
≥ Δ + Δ + Δ









When (4.1) holds, the managers coordinate reluctantly. They feel aggrieved and will shade, 
reducing the social surplus down to 
 
(4.2)  ). ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A w w Y Y z Y Y z S Δ + Δ + + = θ  
 
Suppose next that (4.1) does not hold. Then coordination will not occur unless the boss reverses 
the decision and forces coordination. Forced coordination leads to aggrievement levels of 
B A w w Δ + Δ  for the managers. Shading costs equal  () θ Δ+ Δ A B ww , given that the shading 
parameter rises from θ  to θ . Thus, the boss reverses if and only if 
 
(4.3)  0 ) ( ≥ Δ + Δ + Δ + Δ B A B A w w v v θ . 
 
So if neither (4.1) nor (4.3) holds, coordination does not occur and 
 
(4.4)  ) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A v v N N z N N z S Δ + Δ − + = θ , 
 




(4.5)  ) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A w w Y Y z Y Y z S Δ + Δ + + = θ . 
 
Summary of Delegation 
 
A) If  0 ≤ Δ + Δ B A v v , coordination does not occur and social surplus is given by 
) , ( ) , ( N N z N N z S B A + = . 
B)  If  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v  and (4.1) holds, managers will coordinate reluctantly and 
). ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A w w Y Y z Y Y z S Δ + Δ + + = θ  
C)  If  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v  and (4.1) does not hold but (4.3) does, the boss forces coordination and 
) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A w w Y Y z Y Y z S Δ + Δ + + = θ . 
D) If  0 > Δ + Δ B A v v  and neither (4.1) nor (4.3) holds, then coordination does not occur, but the 
boss is aggrieved and 
) ( ) , ( ) , ( B A B A v v N N z N N z S Δ + Δ − + = θ . 
 
It is useful to compare the outcome under delegation with that under integration. It is easy to see 
that (4.1) implies (3.2), given that  1 < θ  and also that (4.3) implies (3.2). It follows that, 
whenever coordination occurs under delegation, i.e., in cases B) or C) above, coordination occurs 
under integration too. However, since (2.5) implies (4.3) (given that  1 ≤ θ ), there is still too 
much coordination under delegation relative to the first-best, i.e., coordination occurs whenever 
it is efficient, but also sometimes when it is inefficient. 
 
Proposition 3. Under delegation there is (weakly) less coordination than under integration, but 
still too much coordination relative to the first-best. 
 
Proposition 3 is intuitive. If unit managers reluctantly coordinate under delegation, i.e., reversal 
is not required, then a professional manager would also coordinate under integration. And if a 
professional manager would reverse delegation to achieve coordination, incurring higher 
aggrievement and shading costs, then she would surely coordinate if reversal were not required.  
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Finally, since  1 ≤ θ , if coordination is efficient, the boss will be prepared to incur the costs of 
reversal to achieve it. 
 
Thus, the tradeoff between integration and delegation is the following: Both yield coordination 
too much of the time, but delegation yields it less of the time and therefore comes closer to the 
first-best. However, to the extent that the boss reverses delegation to achieve coordination, the 
deadweight losses from shading are higher under delegation than under integration. 
 
The next proposition shows that delegation is never strictly optimal under certainty. 
 
Proposition 4. Under perfect certainty, non-integration or integration can be strictly optimal, but 
delegation is never strictly optimal. 
 
Proof. Suppose first that the equilibrium outcome under delegation is ( N N, ). Then the 
equilibrium outcome under non-integration cannot be worse than this: either it is ( N N, ) with 
less shading, or it is ( Y Y, ), which is Pareto superior. 
 
Suppose next that the equilibrium outcome under delegation is ( Y Y, ). If (4.1) holds, so does 
(3.2), and so coordination occurs under integration with the same shading costs. On the other 
hand, if (4.1) does not hold, then (4.3) must hold, since otherwise the outcome would be ( N N, ). 
But if (4.3) holds, then (3.2) holds, and so coordination again occurs under integration with 
lower shading costs. 
 
Finally, it is easy to find parameters such that (N,N) is socially optimal , and non-integration 
yields (N,N), while integration and delegation yield (Y,Y); and parameters such that (Y,Y) is  
socially optimal, and integration yields (Y,Y), while non-integration and delegation yield (N,N). 





Delegation may, however, be superior to either non-integration or integration in a world of 
uncertainty. For delegation to be better, it is important that  θ θ > . To see this, note that if  θ θ = , 
(4.1) implies (4.3), and (4.3) and (3.2) are equivalent. Thus, cases B) and C) above are both ones 
where (3.2) holds. A comparison of cases B)-D) and (3.3) then shows that the outcome under 
integration with delegation is identical to that under integration. From now on, therefore, we 
suppose  θ θ > . 
 
Assume that payoffs are drawn from a commonly known probability distribution, and are 
observed by both parties ex post (there is symmetric information). To understand how delegation 
can be strictly optimal, it is useful to focus on the special case where  w w w B A Δ = Δ = Δ . Also, 
write  ) (
2
1
B A v v v Δ + Δ = Δ . Then the first-best condition for coordination (2.5) is  w v Δ ≥ Δ , 
where   denotes absolute value. If  0 ≤ Δv , all organizational forms – non-integration, 
integration and delegation – yield the same outcome: non-coordination. So assume  0 > Δv . Then 
the condition for coordination without reversal under delegation (reluctant coordination) 
becomes  w v Δ ≥ Δ θ , while the condition for coordination with reversal under delegation (forced 
coordination) becomes  w v Δ > Δ θ . In contrast, the condition for coordination under integration 













w Δ θ w Δ θ w Δ
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The situation is illustrated in Figure 3, where w Δ is fixed and v Δ varies. For low values of  v Δ , 
w v Δ ≤ Δ θ , there is coordination under neither integration nor delegation. For values of 
v Δ above  w Δ θ , there is coordination under integration. In contrast, under delegation,  v Δ  has to 
reach  w Δ θ  before coordination occurs. The good news about delegation relative to integration, 
then, is that, in the range  w v w Δ ≤ Δ ≤ Δ θ θ , it achieves a more efficient outcome. The bad news 






≤ Δ ≤ Δ , delegation achieves coordination, but with higher shading 
costs since reversal is required. 
 
It is fairly clear when delegation will dominate integration. Suppose that the probability 





≥ Δ . Then delegation achieves non-coordination when this is efficient, and coordination 
when this is efficient; moreover, the shading costs are low when coordination occurs since 
reversal is not required. In contrast under integration coordination would occur also when it is  
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inefficient – i.e., in the range  w v w Δ ≤ Δ ≤ Δ θ θ .  
 
The intuition is simple. Delegation can be a good way for the boss to commit not to intervene 
when this is inefficient, given that the costs of intervening, i.e, reversal, are high. Note finally, 
that over the range where delegation is superior to integration, delegation will also be superior to 
non-integration if, when the gains from coordination are large, they are unevenly divided. 
 
 
5. Platform Leadership and Standards – Cisco’s purchase of StrataCom 
 
In this section we describe a context where we think our approach, broadly interpreted, is 
particularly relevant – the struggle for platform leadership in the network industry. We use Cisco 
as an example, because Bunnell (2000) provides a detailed, informative account of Cisco’s 
acquisition strategy. We illustrate this strategy with Cisco’s acquisition of StrataCom. 
 
Standards are very important in rapidly evolving industries like information and communication 
technology. The social benefits from a common standard can be huge, but getting parties to agree 
to a standard is often difficult, because the benefits from adopting a single standard tend to be 
unevenly distributed.  Instead, standards tend to be supported through self-enforcing, multi-
lateral cross-licensing agreements and industry consortia.  
 
Naturally, the players owning key technological platforms have a disproportionate say in the 
evolution of the industry. Therefore, the rewards from winning the battle for platform leadership 
are huge (Gawer and Cusumano (2002)) and result in complex strategic games among the 
contenders. In these games, acquisition strategies play an important role, for reasons that our 
model captures at least in part.  
 
Cisco’s Internet Operating System (IOS) illustrates a technological platform that came to 
dominate its industry (the network industry) in the course of the 1990s. This was no accident. 
When John Chambers became the CEO of Cisco in 1992, he set as his goal to make Cisco “the  
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architect of the Internet” (Bunnell (2000), p. 79) by getting control of how the network 
ecosystem would evolve. The value of controlling the architecture was accentuated by the 
customers’ desire to buy end-to-end solutions that integrated the underlying technologies into a 
seamless user experience.  
 
Acquisitions played a key role in achieving Cisco’s goal. Under Chambers’ leadership, Cisco 
became the ultimate serial acquirer. Between 1993 and 2000, it bought a total of 71 companies – 
23 companies in 2000 alone. Most of the acquired companies were start-ups, bought to fill gaps 
in the expanding technological space that Cisco wanted to control. Arguably, the most critical 
acquisition that Cisco made in this period was the purchase in 1996 of StrataCom, the leading 
provider of a small, but rapidly expanding, new transmission technology, ATM (Asynchronous 
Transmission Mode). It is instructive to look at this acquisition in some detail. 
 
ATM was a new, cheaper technology that was quite different from the packet based technology 
(Internet Protocol) that IOS was built for. For ATM to work with Cisco equipment, IOS had to 
be adapted. Integrating ATM into IOS meant a major change in Cisco’s leading industry 
platform. 
 
Deciding what to do about ATM became a big strategic decision for Cisco. The main concern 
was that ATM might eventually displace significant pieces of Cisco’s own router-based 
technology. Customers were keen on getting ATM into their networks, because it was a more 
cost efficient technology. Even though the major ATM players (including StrataCom) were still 
small, they were growing fast. Cisco concluded that ATM had the potential to derail its plans to 
be the architect of the networking industry and felt it had to respond. 
 
Cisco had three main ways to respond to the ATM threat: 
 
(a) Non-integration without coordination. Cisco could decide not to adapt IOS to the ATM 
standard and hope that ATM would not take hold. ATM’s incompatibility with IOS  
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would make it tough for ATM players to grow very large given IOS’s significant 
customer base, but it could be a risky and costly battle that Cisco might lose.  
 
(b) Non-integration with coordination. Cisco could adapt IOS to ATM without making a 
major acquisition such as StrataCom. (Cisco had already bought Lightstream, a smaller 
player, as a safety play, but this had worked out poorly, because of skeptical customer 
reception; its size was too insignificant and customers weren’t sure that Cisco would 
support the technology in the long run – as it turns out, a valid concern.) This strategy 
would require Cisco to work with the leading ATM firms, making it much easier for 
ATM to grow and usurp Cisco’s technology. In fact, three years earlier Cisco had made 
an agreement with StrataCom and AT&T to collaborate on the definition of standards and 
the development of products for ATM, but apparently these efforts did not work out.  
 
(c) Integration with coordination. Cisco could buy StrataCom (or some other major ATM 
player), adapt IOS to ATM internally, and become an industry leader in the ATM market. 
This would support Cisco’s ambitions to be the architect of the network industry. By 
holding the decision rights to both technologies, Cisco could determine how the two 
technologies should be integrated to provide a seamless customer experience and 
maximize overall surplus – much of which would flow into Cisco’s pockets, of course, if 
it could win the platform game. 
 
Cisco chose option (c), the same strategy that it had successfully followed when the switching 
technology became a threat and it bought Crescendo. Cisco paid 4.7 Billion dollars for 
StrataCom – by far the most expensive acquisition that it had made until then and an incredibly 
high price for a start-up with modest earnings. Cisco’s stock price jumped 10% on the 
announcement of the deal. 
 
How well does this case fit our model? 
 
The price of the deal makes clear that significant joint benefits from coordination were  
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anticipated. Integrating ATM and IOS seamlessly, and in a way that maximized the joint benefits 
of Cisco and StrataCom rather than those of the whole industry, would give Cisco and StrataCom 
a much better shot at winning the platform game. Thus, from a financial point of view, 
coordination was the preferred option. Next one has to ask whether coordination would have 
been feasible across the market, since then Proposition 2 states that this is better than 
coordination through integration. But, as noted in the description of option (b), cooperation 
across the market appeared difficult; the earlier attempts to cooperate with StrataCom and AT&T 
were not successful. One can guess that the reason was the reluctance of StrataCom, the dwarf in 
the relationship, to cooperate (press the Y button), because this would have tilted the playing 
field too much in favor of the giant Cisco. Arguably, option (b) failed because of an uneven split 
of the surplus.
 11  
 
For integration to be desirable, the effects on private benefits also have to be considered. 
Adapting Cisco’s IOS to the new ATM technology was something many Cisco employees 
disliked, both because ATM was “not invented here,” and because ATM was a cheaper, less 
sophisticated technology to which Cisco’s sales people strongly objected. But given the 
enormous acquisition price, it is evident that the strategic and financial benefits were judged to 
be so large that they overwhelmed perceived losses in private benefits within Cisco. The private 
losses on StrataCom’s side were probably small, and there may even have been private gains (in 
contrast to (2.3)), given that StrataCom’s technology was adopted. One common reason why 
entrepreneurial firms may sell out to a large player like Cisco (besides the money they get from 
selling their shares) is that access to a huge customer base brings their projects onto a large stage 
quickly. 
 
Cisco’s acquisition strategy, and the rules that Cisco used to determine its favored partners, make 
clear that Cisco was sensitive to the issue of private benefits. Chambers’ five desiderata for 
partners were these: a common vision, culturally compatible, would deliver a quick win for the 
                                                 
11 Our model considers only one binary decision. In reality there is of course a long vector of decisions. StrataCom 
may have coordinated along some dimensions for modest joint gains, but not at the technological level that would be 
possible under integration. We are equating sub-par coordination with non-coordination.  
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shareholders, a long-term win for all constituencies, and be geographically close (Bunnell (2000) 
p. 65). Chambers went to great length to avoid losses to employees, to minimize, we may 
assume, quits and shading. He wanted the acquired firms to stay as independent as possible 
within Cisco to maintain the spirit of entrepreneurship and worker motivation. Typically, the 
newly acquired firm only had to make its products compatible with IOS and submit to the 
purchase and sales systems in Cisco. Otherwise it would be rather free to pursue its own agenda. 
The commitment worked: Cisco had a reputation for being a benevolent, well-liked acquirer.  
 
The Mario rule illustrates Chambers’ efforts to protect entrepreneurial employees (Bunnell 
(2000), p. 37). The rule, named after the CEO of Cresendo, Mario Mazzola, stated that no 
employee of a newly acquired company could be terminated without the consent of Chambers 
and the former CEO. We interpret the Mario rule as a form of delegation. Interestingly, Cisco 
abandoned this rule after the dot.com crash in 2000 when it was forced to lay off thousands of 
employees because of the deep technology recession. Evidently, delegated rights are not as 
secure as ownership rights, but they are not valueless either, a distinction that fits our delegation 
model well. 
 
It is worth asking whether hold-up based property rights theories fit the Cisco story as well or 
better than ours. It is true that, in hold-up models as well as our model, there is concern about 
being locked in and becoming unduly dependent on an outsider – for a service or a key element 
in one’s strategy. It is also clear that there are hold-up concerns in this broad sense in the Cisco-
StrataCom deal. But we do think the essence of the deal was less about hold-ups and financial 
extraction than it was about the ability to control the path of ATM-IOS integration and its future 
development. In Chambers’ own words: “With a combination of IP [internet protocol] routing 
and ATM we can define the Internet of the future” (Bunnell (2002), p 88). Also, the meticulous 
attention to employees in both firms and the key rules for acquisitions are evidence in favor of 






In the traditional property rights model asset ownership affects incentives to invest in human 
capital, but not ex post outcomes. In our model decision rights directly affect what happens ex 
post. Our structure is in many ways close to the traditional view of the firm as a technologically 
defined entity that makes decisions about inputs, outputs and prices. The difference is that our 
firm does not necessarily maximize profits, either because a boss cares directly about 
nontransferable private benefits or because the boss is forced to internalize them given that 
employees can shade. It is this relatively small wrinkle in the traditional model that opens the 
door to a discussion of boundaries. In the traditional model, barring regulatory constraints, it 
would be optimal to organize all activity in a single firm. 
 
We have also found it useful to embellish the basic model in Section 2 with the aggrievement 
approach of Hart and Moore (2008). There are two important benefits that we think more than 
off-set the added complexity. First, the basic model does not explain the need for an initial 
choice of ownership: one could equally well have chosen the optimal ownership structure ex 
post. Furthermore, in a dynamic model with uncertainty, one would expect to see continuous 
reallocations of decision rights. Reference points and aggrievement bring a natural source of 
inertia into the model that makes the ex ante choice relevant. That this source of inertia is 
empirically relevant is suggested by the Cisco example – restructuring makes some people 
aggrieved, sometimes so much that acquisitions will not happen. 
 
Inertia is also what makes delegation distinct from ownership. How one allocates decision rights 
within the firm will make a difference.
12 Firms do a lot of internal restructuring and many do 
major ones several times a decade in response to changes in their strategic situation. These 
restructurings have powerful effects not only on how the organization operates, but also on how 
employees feel. They do not come without cost. The section on delegation is an indication that 
                                                 
12 Aghion and Tirole’s (1997) distinction between formal and real authority has some similarities with the approach 
we have taken, but their model does not feature inertia, which we think is a critical feature for studying 
restructurings. At a more basic level, in their model the boss does not delegate decision rights. She decides not to use 
her right when she doesn’t have the information to do so.  
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the approach here could be fruitful for analyzing internal organization and restructurings.  
 
Private benefits play a pivotal role in our analysis. An alternative would have been to let 
incentive effects counter-balance the benefits from integration (as in Mailath et al, 2004). We 
chose the current path, because the analysis seems more tractable and the framework more 
flexible – among other things it permits an investigation of delegation. It remains to be seen how 
important private benefits are empirically. 
 
One of our objectives in writing this paper has been to move the focus of attention away from 
assets towards activities. Asset ownership is at the core of the property rights theory and it will 
remain important for understanding boundaries. At the same time it is remarkable how few 
practitioners, organizational consultants, or researchers studying organizations within other 
disciplines than economics (e.g. sociology and organizational behavior) ever talk about firms in 
terms of asset ownership. For most of them a firm is defined by the things it does and the 
knowledge and capabilities it possesses. Coase (1988) makes clear that he too is looking for “a 
theory which concerns itself with the optimum distribution of activities, or functions, among 
firms” (p. 64). He further notes that “the costs of organizing an activity within any given firm 
depend on what other activities the firm is engaged in. A given set of activities will facilitate the 
carrying out of some activities but hinder the performance of others.” The model we have 
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